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Fiduciary-isms:
A Study of Academic Influence on the Expansion of the Law
We have this kind of wine, not real port, but a tolerably close approximation to
port, and we call it “port type”. But then someone produces a new kind of wine,
not port exactly, but also not quite the same as what we now call “port type”. So
what are we to say? Is it port-type type? It would be tedious to have to say so,
and besides there would clearly be no future in it.1
I. Introduction
On arriving in Nashville in August 1989 to clerk for Gilbert Merritt, Jr., then
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, I was asked to
read a draft opinion of Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.2 Oral
argument had been in March. The judge just wanted to bounce his position off his new
clerks before publication. Twelve years earlier, a handful of movie theaters in Memphis
had formed a buying group or “split” that would nominate a member to receive exclusive
rights to show a first-run film without competitive bidding against other theaters, a
scheme in which the film distributors (who were arms of the producers) acquiesced.3
Balmoral Cinema, who was outside the split, sued the distributors and theaters, alleging
that the practice was an anticompetitive boycott in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.4 Both groups of defendants insisted that the agreement lawfully enhanced rather than
stifled competition by bypassing distributors’ pricey licensing auctions and sizeable cash
guarantees, which elevated costs to theaters and moviegoers.5 Likewise did defendants

1

J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 75 (1962).
Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989).
3
Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 314-15 (6th Cir. 1989).
4
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (“Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal.”).
5
Balmoral Cinema, 885 F.2d at 316.
2

2

deny that the split caused Balmoral Cinema’s dire financial circumstances, which owed
instead to overpaying for rights to exhibit “Voyage of the Damned” while offering
nothing for “Star Wars” and “Close Encounters of the Third Kind.”6
That same summer of 1989 I had taken a course in antitrust law at University of
Florida from Professor Jeffrey Harrison, a gifted teacher who had written the leading
books and articles on point. During that course I came to adopt his position as my own:
the arrangement between the members of the split and the participation by the distributors
placed an illegal drag on competition. As Professor Harrison later summarized,
“‘cooperative buying’ may be nothing more than a euphemism for collusive monopsony
that drives prices below competitive levels and has negative economic effects on social
welfare similar to those caused by price fixing sellers.”7 To clarify, monopsony is to
concentrated buying power what monopoly is to concentrated selling power.8
When summoned to report back to the judge on Balmoral Cinema – my summerschool class in antitrust fresh on my mind – I sided with Balmoral Cinema and what I
saw as the public interest in non-rigged bidding processes for first-run films. Judge
Merritt listened as I detailed my professor’s arguments on why we should throw the book
at the split and the distributors for impeding competition by stymying a true auction for
film exhibition. Excluding Balmoral Cinema from bidding for first-run films, I parroted,
would profit everyone but movie-goers, to whom the monopsonist-buying group would

6

Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 219, 224 (W.D. Tenn.
1987), aff’d, 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989).
7
ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
93-94 (1993); see ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 34, 86-87 (2010).
8
Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1539,
1565-68 (1989).
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not pass on its savings in a market with fewer buyers than under competition.9 After all,
only a monopolist can offer a discount, which, after running off rivals, invariably ends,
replaced by competition-free price hikes.10 When I finished my recitation, the judge set
forth the jarring costs of finding a violation of the Sherman Act: millions of dollars
change hands, businesses shut down, people lose jobs. The judge was unsurprised that my
arguments had been lifted from a professor, since that’s what professors do: they see it as
their job to expand the law in their field. It’s not, however, he cautioned, what courts do.
The Sixth Circuit ruled unanimously in favor of defendants, affirming Judge McRae’s
decision below.11
The full import of this encounter in the judge’s chambers was largely lost on me
until my employer, California Western School of Law [CWSL], was proposing a merger
with University of California at San Diego [UCSD]. Throughout the merger discussions
(2007-2011), CWSL faculty, administrators, and lay board members debated whether, in
hammering out a workable arrangement with UCSD, legal barriers would arise if CWSL
faculty turned out to be “fiduciaries” of the school. If faculty were fiduciaries, then it was
9

Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
297, 303-04 (1991).
10
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 287
(2003).
11
Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 219, 224 (W.D. Tenn.
1987), affirmed, 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989). Among the various court challenges to splits, there
was some contrary authority supporting my professor’s position, notably General Cinema Corp.
v. Buena Vista Distribution Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1982). There, a district court,
relying on academic lawyers, ruled in favor of the very same film distributor, this time as
counterclaimant opposing the split, which exhibitors were accused of manipulating to suppress
the profits of distributors/producers through price-fixing. Gen. Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista
Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1264 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (citing Robert H. Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 826 &
n.162 (1965); James S. Gordon, Horizontal and Vertical Restraints of Trade: The Legality of
Motion Picture Splits under the Antitrust Laws, 75 YALE L.J. 239, 250 (1966)); see also United
States v. Capitol Service, Inc., 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985).
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their duty to act for their principals, that is, the parties whose interests fiduciaries must
put above their own. Accordingly, faculty looking to get a better deal for themselves than
for the school or other principals would be breaching their fiduciary duty, a tortious act.
I thought the merger was a bad idea, at least in its proposed iteration. My image of
the reconstituted post-merger law school had an ominous vibe of layoffs, demotions, and
an up-in-the-airness that worried me. After twenty years at the same school, I liked things
well enough the way they were. As a husband and father of three, I resisted anything that
might be, well, bad for me personally. But if I really was a fiduciary, then maybe what I
wanted was beside the point. At the same time, if I really was a fiduciary, then who was
my principal? The school? Who is that? Is it the administration? Current students?
Alumni? Employees? The community? No answers from the merger’s proponents were
forthcoming.
Fiduciaries are said to operate outside the capitalist free-for-all of exchange
relations,12 where the freedom of contract is backed up by the power of contract, which
provides judicially coerced remedies for breach.13 Breaching fiduciaries cough up not just
the market and consequential damages inflicted on victims, but all gains and savings,
12

Fiduciary relations are not necessarily contractual. Trustees’ relations with trust beneficiaries,
for instance, are not contractual, nor can corporate shareholders negotiate the corporate charter,
by-laws, or managers’ employment terms. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887 (1988) (partners’ acts in dissolution
may violate fiduciary duties even if permitted by partnership agreement); Tamar Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 813 (1983) (citing AUSTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 106 (3d ed. 1967)).
13
See Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 495
(1962):
Power of contract is one of the two sides of freedom of contract. On one hand, freedom
of contract is a freedom from restraint, an immunity from legal reprisal for making or
receiving promises. On the other hand, it is not really a freedom of contract, but a
power of contract, a power to secure legal sanctions when another breaks his promise.
Cf. Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. L.
REV. 763, 777 (1998) (contracts both create and restrain power).
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even those exceeding the rental rate the parties would have reached in a voluntary
exchange.14 Nor can an insolvent fiduciary’s creditors reach the property, which is said to
have been held all along, however fictively, for the victim-principal, never becoming part
of the estate of the fiduciary.15
Fiduciaries operate in Platonic relations within which the weak or naïve party
(dubbed “principal” or “beneficiary”) is subordinate to the strong or knowing party, who
inverts the relation by subordinating him- or herself to the weak party. The strong-party
fiduciary takes responsibility for the power/knowledge disparity by, in effect, negating its
effects by putting the weak party’s interests first.
Identifying fiduciary relationships is done by analogy to the law of trusts.16 The
more a candidate for fiduciary status resembles a trustee, the more likely he or she will be
treated like one. The purpose of the analogy is to smooth out conflicts of interest between
wealth managers and their clients. Yet this venerable process of arguing by analogy, an
essential lawyerly shtick, has allowed for a peculiar extension of fiduciary law.17 The

14

E.g., Am. Master Lease v. Idanta Partners, Ltd., 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 548, 572-77 (Cal. App. 2014).
E.g., In re Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., 227 B.R. 244, 253-55 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Robert W.
Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 889, 896 (1994).
16
E.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 891 (1998) (“The evolution of the law of fiduciary obligation illustrates, perhaps more
powerfully than most bodies of law, the power of analogy in legal argumentation.”); Calvin
Massey, American Fiduciary Duty in an Age of Narcissism, 54 SASK. L. REV. 101 (1990); Eileen
A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary
Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897 (1993); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69 (1962).
17
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 805 (1983):
[C]ourts are inconsistent in choosing their analogies. One decision, for example, held
that directors are trustees, and applied trust rules against self-dealing to them. But, in
order to avoid applying trust law's strict liability for unauthorized unintentional acts to
the directors, the court then proceeded to hold that those directors were not trustees.
15
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cause? Another essential lawyerly shtick: the sort of pressure Judge Merritt alluded to
above that is placed on law by academic lawyers.
After Part II of this Article sets out the structure of trusts, Part III tests whether
the trust analogy makes non-misleading sense within the laws of partnerships,
corporations, and agency. Specifically, Part IV demonstrates how academic writing,
deploying a sense of “fiduciary” so open as to be empty, has influenced courts to
designate franchisors, insurers, and professors as fiduciaries. After Part V posits how this
influence has brought about an idiomatic, no-longer technical sense of this essential term
of art, I conclude that professors’ penchant for pressuring law to change is an activity of
uncertain value.
II. Fiduciaries in Trust Relations
The idea of the fiduciary owes to the law of trusts.18 A trust, in turn, like its
historical antecedent – the “use”19 – is a gift.20 While ordinary gifts are two-party
transfers of real or personal property from donor to donee, trusts involve three parties: the
donor (settlor) arranges with the trustee to divide title to the donated property (trust res)
between trustee and beneficiary.21 In trust relations, “fiduciary” describes the trustee,
whose divided interest received from the settlor is “legal” title to the res, which the settlor
18

In re West of England and South Wales District Bank, ex. P. Dale & Co., 11 Ch.D. 772, 778
(1879):
What is a fiduciary relationship? It is one in respect of which if a wrong arise, the same
remedy exists against the wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a
trustee on behalf of the cestui que trust.
19
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); 4 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 407–79 (3d ed. 1945).
20
At least trusts were until trustees began accepting compensation for operating between settlor
and beneficiary. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 639 (1995).
21
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 632
(1995).
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directs the trustee-fiduciary to manage for the enjoyment of the settlor’s beneficiary.22
The beneficiary’s divided interest received from the settlor is “equitable” title to the trust
property, which, according to the trust’s terms, will eventually reunite the divided legal
and equitable title interests to the beneficiary’s sole advantage.23
The trust developed at the end of the Middle Ages, when real estate was the
principal form of wealth. The primary purpose of the trust was to facilitate the transfer of
freehold land within the family.24 The trust allowed landowners “‘to make decent
provision for their wives, daughters and younger sons and to prevent escheat’” while
avoiding other vestiges of bizarre feudal restrictions.25 Trustees early on were mere
stakeholders with no serious powers or responsibilities of management. Commonly, the
beneficiaries lived on and managed the land.26
In an era (fourteenth to seventeenth centuries) when property was less alienable
than now, the trust, apart from facilitating conveyances within families, was a way to get
around the ban on unmarried adults, clerics, Christians, foreigners, criminals, and slaves
owning property.27 Trusts let property owners arrange for the enjoyment of property by
these banned classes by passing legal title to a trustee who held for the equitable owner, a
member of the banned class.

22

In re Estate of Giraldin, 55 Cal. 4th 1058, 1065-68 (2012).
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 553 (4th ed. 2012).
24
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 632
(1995).
25
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 633
(1995) (quoting WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, Trust, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW § 9, at 12 (1973)).
26
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 633
(1995).
27
2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 231, 237-38 (2d ed. 1898).
23
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Trusts eventually became an effective way to manage a portfolio of financial
assets,28 guard against waste of property by an immature or irresponsible family member,
or avoid taxes on the settlor’s estate.29 Because trustees are exposed to temptation to use
trust assets for personal benefit, they may collect fees for their services in amounts
authorized by the trust or by court approval, but may not otherwise profit from the trust.30
Consequently, any profits diverted by the trustee are disgorged and conveyed to the
beneficiary in restitution as the remedy for the trustee’s unjust enrichment.31 Not
surprisingly in this Platonic relation of inverted power, both the trustee’s resignation32
and removal33 are far from automatic.
III. Fiduciaries in Trust-Like Relations
Fiduciary law expanded from the trust, to partnerships, to joint stock companies
and corporations, to agents and factors.34 Much of the pioneering work in the
development of the scope of the word “fiduciary” was done not by courts, but by treatise

28

John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629
(1995).
29
See, e.g., Richard W. Nenno, Planning To Minimize or Avoid State Income Tax on Trusts, 34
AM. COLL. OF TR. AND EST. COUNSEL 131, 143-44 (2008).
30
See, e.g., 4C MISSOURI PRAC. TRUST CODE & LAW MANUAL § 456.7-708 (2015-16 ed.).
31
In re Beatty’s Estate, 214 Pa. 449 (1906).
32
TEX. PROPERTY CODE ANN. § 113.081 (West 1984).
33
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 806 (1983) (“Under trust law, a
beneficiary cannot remove the trustee without proving in court that the trustee is incapacitated or
has a substantial conflict of interest.”); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trusts Law,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 664 (2004) (Law “does not necessarily permit removal for breaches
that are not ‘serious’ or for simple disagreements. Trustees who were chosen by the settlor, as
compared to those named by a third party or a court, are even less readily removed; there is ... a
thumb on the scale for them.”).
34
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 805 (1983).
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writers of the Romantic era: Jeremy (1828), Lewin (1837), Maddock (1837), and Story
(1839).35 The pioneering continues.36
A. Partnerships
The principle that middle-men/trustees must tend others’ interests, not their own,
has been converted into a more generalized constraint on professionals’ permissible range
of wealth-maximizing endeavors. For example, partnerships, which emerged in the
sixteenth century37 (or before),38 have always traded on the criteria or structure of trusts.
So it is by now hornbook that “[i]n defining fiduciary responsibilities, courts ... borrow
from the ... standards applied to fiduciaries in other contexts,” even though “standards
developed to regulate other fiduciaries would not control the conduct expected of
partners.”39 To be sure, the analogy between trusts and partnerships is strained.
Partnerships are “association[s] of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit.”40 Within this structure, partners may shield themselves from personal
liability for debts incurred by the partnership.41 As co-owners, partners may sue each
other; the partnership, too, as an entity separate from its members, may sue and be sued

35

L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 72 n.11.
E.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 881 (1988) (“The evolution of fiduciary obligation ... owe[s] much to the situationspecificity and flexibility that were Equity's hallmarks.”); Alaimo v. Royer, 188 Conn. 36, 41
(1982) (This court has, however, specifically refused to define “a fiduciary relationship in precise
detail and in such a manner as to exclude new situations.”).
37
WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER’S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
1 (rev. perm. ed. 1974).
38
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 795 n.3 (1983) (citing JUDSON CRANE &
ALAN BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 11 (1968)).
39
Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 459
(1987).
40
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40
HARV. L. REV. 521 (1927) (quoting UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1) (1917)).
41
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-45 (West 1999).
36
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by the partners.42 Eccentric from the standpoint of the grammar of trusts, partners as
fiduciaries are considered both trustee and beneficiary at once.43 In other words, in
partnerships, the weak-party beneficiary is also the strong-party trustee in the Platonic
sense referred to above, thus stretching reed-thin the notion of divided title. “The
fiduciary as joint owner,” therefore, “is something of a contradiction in terms, since the
fiduciary lacks the beneficial interest aspect of true ownership. Partners, on the other
hand, are always joint owners” in both senses,44 all rowing together for the greater good
of the partnership. There is, in sum, no middle-man manager of partnership assets, a key
element of (real) trust relations.45 Nor does the function of settlor in a trust have specific
application to partnerships.
Although trusts and partnerships share only a vague family resemblance, breaches
that go to the essence of a partnership agreement are considered betrayals, not just run-ofthe-mill derelictions of a contracting party’s promises.46 At times the partnership-as-trust
analogy is literalized. For example, in Massachusetts, “partners act as trustees for the
benefit of each other with respect to the trust res which consists of the partnership
assets.”47 If there were any doubt about what this means, a federal bankruptcy court has
clarified both that “Massachusetts partnerships satisfy the necessary elements of an

42

REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 405 (a)-(b) (2014); cf. State v. Gard, 742 N.W.2d 257,
262 (S.D. 2007)(“[T]he law in most states today is that a partner can be found guilty of
embezzlement when he misappropriates funds from his partnership”).
43
Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 334-35 (1897) (Partnership is “a contract of mutual
agency, each partner acting as a principal in his own behalf and as agent for his co-partner.”).
44
Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 458
(1987).
45
Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 900
(1997).
46
Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 601-02 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
47
In re Friedman, 298 B.R. 487, 498 (D. Mass. 2003) (italics omitted).
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express trust and that partners act in a fiduciary capacity toward each other” for purposes
of determining whether a breaching fiduciary’s debt to the partnership is dischargeable in
bankruptcy.48 Massachusetts is not alone.49
While in normal contractual settings capitalism encourages opportunism, tort law
expects much more from fiduciaries. Central to the sort of theatricalized lingo that has
always pervaded fiduciary law is Justice Cardozo’s celebrated downstage declamation in
Meinhard v. Salmon, cited some 5,000 times since 1928, a highly theatricalized elevation
of the fiduciary over the base “morals of the market place.”50
Despite the moralizing,51 a partner, it turns out, “is not the sort of fiduciary who
must behave as a disinterested trustee”:52 partners can and do pursue self-interest.53 If the
law saw things otherwise, unprofitable partners would be expected to withdraw for the
good of the partnership; but they are not.54 Indeed, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
of 1997 [RUPA], now adopted by some two-thirds of the states,55 has codified the
48

In re Friedman, 298 B.R. 487, 499 (D. Mass. 2003) (reading 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2016). But
cf. In re Seay, 215 B.R. 780, 786 & n.6 (10th Cir. 1997) (detailing Tenth Circuit split on whether
partnerships are also trusts for purposes of § 523(a)(4)).
49
For example, Arizona (DeSantis v. Dixon, 72 Ariz. 345, 236 (1951)), and California (Leff v.
Gunter, 33 Cal. 3d 508, 514 (1983)), follow the Massachusetts position. See generally In re
Humphries, 516 B.R. 856, 868 n.8 (N.D. Miss. 2014) (detailing circuit-split over nature of copartners’ relations for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)(2016)).
50
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64 (1928).
51
Compare Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425,
456 (1987)(“There is a moral theme to the concept of fiduciary responsibilities”), with Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 438 n.28
(1993)(“Fiduciary duties ... have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived
and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.”).
52
Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 905
(1997).
53
Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 465
(1987).
54
Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 896
(1997).
55
John M. Taylor, Professional Partner Expulsion: The Effects of RUPA and Section 736,
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judgment that partners cannot realistically be expected to be out only for others.56
Specifically, section 404(e) of RUPA provides that “[a] partner does not violate ... this act
or ... a partnership agreement merely because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s
interest.”57 While trustees are strictly liable for acting against their beneficiaries’
interests, partners’ duties are only to avoid harms to the partnership through gross
negligence or worse.58 Section 404(e) therefore diverges from what is found in many
judicial opinions: an injunction against a partner’s pursuit of advantage over the
partnership.59
This divergence reflects developments in corporate law, where judicial
supervision of fiduciaries has backed off from traditional fiduciary-law rhetoric.60 In
particular, under RUPA, partners may re-bargain their agreement on the fly, lend money
to the partnership, purchase its assets, or obtain waivers of fiduciary duties for specific
purposes.61 By codifying the permissible pursuit of self-interest, RUPA acknowledges
that sweeping statements of fiduciary duties invite costly litigation and threats of

BUSINESS ENTITIES 1, 5 (May/June 2007); Clay B. Wortham, Revised Uniform Partnership Act:
Anomalies of a Simplified, Modernized Partnership Law, 92 KY. L.J. 1083, 1083 n.4
(2004)(citing ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 1, at 53132 (2003)).
56
Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 905
(1997).
57
See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399, 1485-86 (2002).
58
CHRISTINE HURT ET AL., ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 8.404, at 326 & n.124
(2001) (Wolters-Kluwer 2015).
59
Dennis J. Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and Fiduciary Duties in Partnership, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 215, 268 & n.266 (2004).
60
See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425,
458 (1987).
61
Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877,
905-07 (1997). These waivers only go so far. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b) (1997).
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litigation, including by partners who seek to avoid some aspect of their partnership
agreement.62 As the reporter for RUPA has summarized: “The partner is no longer a
trustee.”63
Push comes to shove, partners see their own function as more Darwinist than the
mincing agents Justice Cardozo associated with fiduciaries 85 years ago. Indeed, in a suit
over a Wall Street law firm’s decision to close its West Palm Beach branch and fire all 17
branch partners, the co-chair of the management committee defended the firm’s position
by testifying that “life is not made up of love, it is made up of fear and greed and money
– how much do you get paid in large measure.”64 Right or wrong, the license afforded
partners to look out for themselves reveals a fundamental flaw in the trust analogy, which
operates in partnership law in only an extended sense.
B. Corporations
Like the partnerships of the sixteenth century, the predecessors of the modern
corporation – the joint stock companies or overseas trading companies of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries – imported fiduciary law65 to tighten up what were seen as weak
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Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877,
905-06 (1997).
63
Donald J. Weidner, Pitfalls in Partnership Law Reform: Some United States Experience, 26 J.
CORP. L. 1031, 1039 (2001); Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act: The Reporters’ Overview, 49 BUS. L. 1, 1 (Nov. 1993).
64
Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA, and Fiduciary Duties, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 881
(1997).
65
William L. Baldwin, The Corporation and Society: An Evolutionary/Institutional Approach, 27
VERMONT L. REV. 841, 842 (2003); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J.
CORP. L. 277, 307 (1998) (“The trust metaphor was first applied in the 1830s by a minority
shareholder in an attempt to hold a director personally liable for a breach of fiduciary duty.”)
(citing George D. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse – Judicial Power to Wind Up a
Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 220, 220 (1940)).
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constraints placed by contract law on the self-dealing temptations of those at the helm.66
To this day, “fiduciarians” continue to defend that move against “contractarians,” who
find fiduciary law a drag on the rough and tumble advantage-taking permitted by contract
law, which, contractarians insist, can competently regulate conflicts on its own.67 Yet
mapping fiduciary law onto corporate law is far from light work, given that the legal
nature of corporations – what they are, who owns them, whom they should benefit – is a
fog.68 Still, as a way of talking about corporate ownership,69 the trust analogy works well
enough for locating shareholders in the role of beneficiary or equitable-title holder. But
the analogy weakens when attempting to locate boards of directors and corporate
managers in the role of trustee or legal-title holder, which they occupy in only the most
etiolated sense.70
1. Divided Title: Shareholders as Equitable Owners
Until the early twentieth century, corporations were seen as aggregates of
individual shareholders woven together by contracts. As such, corporations possessed no
66

D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
1459 (2002) (“The fiduciary duties of directors ... is a requirement to abstain from self-interested
behavior.”).
67
See, e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Bumping Along the Bottom: Abandoned Principles and
Failed Fiduciary Standards in Uniform Partnership and LLC Statutes, 96 KY. L.J. 163, 173-74 &
nn.37-39 (2007); Mark J. Lowenstein, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated Business Entities: In
Defense of the “Manifestly Unreasonable” Standard, 41 TULSA L. REV. 411, 411 n.1, 413-14
(2006).
68
Alfred F. Conrad, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117,
120-21 & n.3 (1988); see also John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate
Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 815-18, 835-39 (1989) (“The
directors of a corporation owe various fiduciary duties to that corporation, and, indirectly, to the
corporation's shareholders insofar as the corporation's affairs are concerned.”).
69
E.g., Joseph Biancalana, Defining the Proper Corporate Constituency: Asking the Wrong
Question, 59 U. CINN. L. REV. 425, 425 (1990) (“In 1932 E. Merrick Dodd asked for whom are
corporate managers trustees? Since that time the question has been asked many times, in many
contexts, for many purposes.”).
70
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 805 (1983); Richard A. Booth, Who
Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 150 (2001).
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identity apart from those individuals and relations.71 Under that “aggregate” or “property”
approach, “[d]irectors were considered agents of shareholders.”72 What is not the same,
directors were considered corporations’ legal owners – fiduciaries73 charged solely with
the wealth-building of their shareholders who,74 in trust terms, were considered equitable
owners of corporate property.75 Another way of saying this is that corporations are owned
by shareholders,76 who delegate control to a board of directors,77 who in turn set policy
and hire, fire, and compensate the CEO, who, under board oversight, runs the company
with the CEO’s management team.78
Typical of trustee-beneficiary relations – predicated on separation of ownership
and control79 – shareholders, like trust beneficiaries, act very little like owners, confident
as they are that management will look out for them.80 Nor could shareholders act much
like owners, given their quite-limited rights to “elect directors and, under some
71

William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 261, 270 (1992).
72
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 261, 267 (1992)(citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)(ruling that
Ford’s corporate mission was to produce shareholder profits, not the meaningful jobs and
affordable cars Henry Ford envisioned).
73
D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 306-07 (1998).
74
D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277-78 (1998).
75
See, e.g., Gail Cagney, Note, Corporate Officers as Employers: Eristic Liability under ERISA,
52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1211, 1217 n.27 (1987).
76
Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1455 (1996) (“Who owns a corporation? We are accustomed to saying that
the shareholders own it.”).
77
D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
1458 (2002) (“[I]n large corporations ... actual control resides with the directors rather than with
the shareholders.”).
78
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 694 (1986).
79
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV.
601, 619-28 (2006).
80
Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 157
(2001).
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circumstances, remove them,” but in no case “tell them what to do.”81 Shareholders hold
title to no corporate property (factories, computers, pencils),82 can initiate nothing,
approve almost nothing, nor join large stock blocks or otherwise freely communicate or
coordinate with other shareholders.83
Similar enough to the interests of equitable owners of a trust res, shareholders get
the leftovers when the company dissolves,84 can take income in the form of dividends or
stock repurchases,85 and bring “derivative” suits against officers and directors reluctant to
sue themselves, recovery going to the corporation, presumably to be distributed pro rata
among stakeholders.86 Unlike trust beneficiaries, however, shareholders have official
leverage with those at the controls by auditioning “takeover” management teams to lead
them,87 voting on some matters,88 and selling the company out from under management,

81

Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 291 (1999) (It thus may make only misleading sense to call managers/directors
“agents” of shareholders).
82
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 291 n.97 (1999).
83
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV.
601, 616-17 (2006); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1455 (1996).
84
Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 163
(2001); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors’ Duty To Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1993); D. Gordon Smith, The
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1458 (2002).
85
Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 165
(2001); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors’ Duty To Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1993).
86
Bruce A. Markell, The Folly of Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining Lawyer
Liability and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, 6 J. BANKR. L.
& PRAC. 403, 420-21 (1997). The shareholder’s derivative action emerged in the mid-nineteenth
century as an equitable device enabling shareholders to enforce rights that the corporation failed
to assert on its own behalf. Those rights include the recovery of losses occasioned by self-dealing
or fraudulent or grossly negligent misconduct by directors or managers. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93 (en banc 1969).
87
John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old
Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 815-18, 835-39 (1989).
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subject to so-called poison pills designed to run off bidders, whose ownership is diluted
by discounts in the company’s or bidder’s stock made available to stockholders.89
Even if managers’ control is like that of trustees (“though it was never very clear
that trust law bore much relation to corporation law”),90 there is authority for the
proposition that shareholders are not the equitable owner-beneficiaries.91 Specifically, by
the late nineteenth century, corporations had taken on a vibe of entities (natural or
artificial) with a legal (albeit fictive) personality separate from its shareholders. This
separate personality, evidenced by limited liability, enabled such entities to sue and be
sued, own, inherit, and dispose of property, and survive the human actors through whom
it acts.92 This entity view reversed the legal notion that directors’ and shareholders’
interests align through directors’ fiduciary duties.93 Instead, on behalf of the entity,
directors juggle the interests not just of shareholders, but “employees, managers,
customers, consumers, and surrounding communities as well,” quite apart from their
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contractual claims.94 This expanded group of beneficiary-stakeholders includes
prospective shareholders in their dealings with insiders95 and creditors when the
corporate-debtor is insolvent or on the brink.96 And so the notion of trusteeship does
speak to a distinct worry: how to rationalize corporate control of vast amounts of wealth
without somehow impressing corporations with a public interest beyond management and
perhaps even stockholders.97 “In the eyes of the law, corporate directors are a unique
form of fiduciary who ... resemble trustees ... constrained primarily by their fiduciary
duties, making trade-offs between the conflicting interests of different corporate
constituencies.”98
In sum, the shareholder-primacy view of the corporate form as expressed in the
trust analogy, though frequently dismissed as passé99 or plain wrong,100 does somehow
manage continually to rehabilitate itself from criticism.101
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Richard A. Booth, Five Decades of Corporation Law: From Conglomeration to Equity
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2. Divided Title: Directors/Managers as Legal Owners
As putative owners of legal title to the corporate res, directors and managers,
unlike shareholders, do act like owners, though not like trustees, despite talk to that effect
both on a literal level102 and by way of simile.103 That managers own little compared to
the wealth they manage, while shareholders defer to them and the directors whom
managers install with shareholder acquiescence, makes corporations arguably
“ownerless.”104 Directors inquire, suggest, and approve or disapprove of managers’
actions; but resignation is their only recourse if they disagree profoundly.105 Likewise
does the control exerted over managers by institutional investors – pension funds, mutual
funds, trustees, and foundations to whom individual savers entrust their funds – further
destabilize conventional notions of ownership when applied to corporate actors.106
Unlike trustees, directors and managers do not hold title to corporate property,
which is in the entity’s name.107 Moreover, because shareholders may diversify, they are
not shy about taking risks at the company level to make a big score. Managers,

77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 169 (2001) (“Despite all the talk about how the stockholders own the
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oppositely, cannot diversify: their fate follows their company’s. Thus is it managers
(particularly CEOs) – staked more than shareholders in company performance – who
think like owners, preferring a fair return and company survival to high-stakes
gambling.108 To avoid shirking of duties by managers, their relations with shareholders
are at least theoretically mediated by boards of directors.109
While managers act like owners of the corporate res, they, like directors, fall too
far outside the criteria of trustees in the strict sense to justify the linguistic move.110 No
one thinks of managers as trustees, an analogy at least one expert has called “corny.”111
Under trust law, as legal owners, trustees can have no beneficial interest in the trust res.
Corporate law, contrariwise, permits manager ownership,112 whereby stock options and
the funding of pension plans with stock has boosted the stakes of active managerinvestors and passive employee-investors.113
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C. Agency
The fig leaf that all fiduciaries are trustees of sorts is removed in agency law. In a
form that took shape in the nineteenth century114 – strongly influenced by treatise
writers115 – agents are cast as fiduciaries, but with no homage to divided title.116
Formally, agency “is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’)
manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s
behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise
consents so to act.”117 With such an open standard, agents abound, held out to include, to
name a few: executors, guardians, receivers, escrow agents, banks, partners, corporate
managers and directors, shareholders of a close corporation, doctors, securities brokers,
real-estate brokers, and accountants.118 Though not trustees,119 agents are subject to many
of the same rules that constrain trustees.120
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See Mary Szto, Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context,
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As for lawyers, they are “first and foremost agents,”121 whose clients are
principals.122 “Quintessential fiduciaries,”123 lawyers are bound both by a professional
code to “represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law,”124 and by tort law’s
“fiduciary obligations of utmost propriety and consideration for the interests of the
client.”125 Lawyers are not, however, “trustee of any claim or asset owned or sought by
[the] client.”126
There is both a procedural and remedial legal significance in the law’s finding
that “liability rules”127 compensating plaintiffs in contracts and negligence actions are
insufficient to regulate agents bent on self-dealing, competing with, or ripping off their
principals.128 Procedurally, fiduciary law sides with plaintiffs by 1) blocking defenses of
contributory or comparative fault, 2) prolonging statutes of limitations, and 3) burdenshifting on the issue of breach.129 Remedially, the Restatement (Third) of Agency
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Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the Difference?, 63
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imposes “property rules”130 – accounting for profits, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and
constructive trust (a coerced transfer back to the victim of property acquired by the
breaching fiduciary) – even absent harm to the principal.131 Likewise are fiduciaries
subject to forfeiture of commissions or fees,132 again, even when the breach earns the
lawyer no profit, as in the divulgence of non-commercial confidences, the revelation of
which causes the client no damage, emotional or otherwise.133 By coercing breaching
lawyers into surrendering their fees, invariant either to their exploitive gains or clients’
losses, fiduciary law has the effect of punishing wrongdoers while evading the otherwise
essential scienter requirement.134
So in what ways, exactly, do lawyers and trustees differ? It is not so much that
lawyers’ relations with clients are too competitive to allow for the professional
selflessness expected of trustees, though tensions do inhere such relations.135 Instead, the
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rub is that lawyers in no sense hold legal title for the benefit of others. Just as “[a] trust
cannot be created unless there is trust property,”136 nor can a trust-like relation, which
trades on the grammar of trusts.137 In contrast to trustees, or even partners and corporate
managers for that matter, lawyers are paid for advice, much of which has a financial
upshot, but precious little of which can count as investment management.138 Much more
centrally do they safe-keep, not invest, client property (e.g., a settlement or damages
award),139 as often as not to avoid extending clients credit during representation (e.g., a
retainer).140
Admittedly, much of fiduciary law is trained on determining when a principal is
responsible for an agent’s dealings with third parties.141 For example, when a bill
collector (agent) hired by a store (principal) absconds with payments collected from a
debtor-customer on behalf of the store, that portion of the debt stolen by the agent is

fees coerced from defendants by the court in lieu of a contingency-fee arrangement, which
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discharged.142 But third parties cannot fairly be characterized as beneficiaries of lawyers’
fiduciary duties, though we can posit extraordinary facts posing such a setup departing
from the convention whereby lawyers’ obligations run uniquely to the client.143 Under
agency law, agents’ dealings with third parties bind their principals, but not because
agents are co-obligated fiduciaries serving two masters, a conflict that would alarm any
first-year student of torts.144 Just as third parties hold nothing like equitable title to a
principal-client’s property, agents hold nothing like legal title to a principal’s property.145
Boiled down, when it comes to third parties, an agent-lawyer is more mediator than
trustee, more conduit than wealth manager.146
Once anything resembling a trust res drops out as an element, it follows that
agency, and what goes hand in hand, fiduciary duty, expand. For instance, according to
the latest Restatement of Agency, all employees are agents, and all agents fiduciaries,147
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the intention being to reduce the temptations of employees, who hold their employers’
good will and wealth over the barrel.148 By handling key functions and cash to boot,149
employees might steal or at a minimum withhold “their best efforts to produce, innovate,
cooperate with management, or share information.”150 No wonder, the story goes,
employers spy on their employees.151
From an employee perspective, however, they are the ones over the barrel:
I can think of no relationship in which one party, the employee, places more
reliance upon the other, is more dependent upon the other, or is more vulnerable
to abuse by the other, than the relationship between employer and employee.
And, ironically, the relative imbalance of economic power between employer
and employee tends to increase rather than diminish the longer that relationship
continues. Whatever bargaining strength and marketability the employee may
have at the moment of hiring, diminishes rapidly thereafter. Marketplace? What
market is there for the factory worker laid off after 25 years of labor in the same
plant, or for the middle-aged executive fired after 25 years with the same
firm?152
Under such a view, employees resort to counter-moves like sabotage only to fend off
their own powerlessness and exploitation.153 Nonetheless, managers of employee health
and retirement plans serve as the only legally recognized, recurring example of the
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employer-fiduciary,154 despite some push from academics to expand.155 Realistically,
neither side could be expected to renounce self-interest, given “the inherently
antagonistic character of the traditional employer-employee relationship.”156 If there were
any question about this, check out final-offer arbitration in major league baseball, where
[t]eams risk injuring their relationship with a player by arguing that his worth is
well below what the player thinks he is worth. A team might be forced to defend
its proposal by “insulting a player and presenting arguments that harp on a
player’s physical or mental defects, or demeaning his past contributions to the
club, playing record or public appeal.”157
Who is the other-regarding, supererogatory fiduciary there? At work, in markets, in
capitalism, we are all over the barrel, though not all of us are fiduciaries.
IV. Academic Influence on Fiduciary Law
There is a nontrivial cost to decoupling fiduciary law from trusts or trust-like
circumstances in which a colorable claim of divided title can be made: counting all
relations based on imbalances of power/knowledge as fiduciary renders the criteria so
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open as to be empty, where anything, like classifying Hamlet as a comedy, is possible.
Flexibility is a virtue sure enough;158 but it is also a vice:159
I have a friend who is fond of defining ‘fiduciary’ as follows: “Fiduciary” is
what the judge calls you before ruling against you. And I think we see a lot of
those sort of complex connotations of the term, which could make it
problematic as used in black-letter text.160
Indeed, the term has become so extended that no longer is it a stretch to say that fiduciary
duties emerge whenever – with or without anything resembling a trust res – one party has
a broad grant of discretion over the other’s interests amidst a dependency relation due to
information asymmetry.161 If all agents are fiduciaries, then who else among powerwielders might we add to the list?
1. Franchisors
Consider franchises, where a successful chain like McDonald’s adds on
entrepreneurial owners while maintaining a tight grip on its brand by “micromanag[ing]
the conduct of its franchisees in excruciating detail, even specifying the order in which
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condiments should be placed on hamburgers.”162 Despite the one-sidedness of franchise
contracts,163 franchisors are not fiduciaries of their franchisees.164
Yet testifying in 1970 before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business,
General Counsel for the Federal Trade Commission John Buffington observed that
“franchisors frequently speak of their relationship with their franchisees as being one of
trust and confidence. It is truly a fiduciary relationship.”165 The next year, Boston
attorney Harold Brown,166 relying solely on Buffington’s “informal” position,167
published “Franchising – A Fiduciary Relationship” in the Texas Law Review, where
Brown made what he claimed to be the first pitch for fiduciary law as a check on
franchisor power.168 The following year a New York trial court, unable to find “any
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American cases that have either applied or rejected the fiduciary theory to franchises,”
ruled anyway that out of Mobil Oil's “dominant economic position” and “control” over a
single-station franchisee (a former Mobil gas-station worker) arose a fiduciary
relationship.169 The court’s authority? Harold Brown’s “well-researched article.”170
From there, Brown’s progress in expanding fiduciary law has been iffy, relying on
over-readings that get promptly repudiated. For example, William Killion, in his ALR
entry summarizing the franchising cases on point, cites Mister Donut of America, Inc. v.
Harris for the proposition that franchisors are fiduciaries of their franchisees.171
Specifically, Killion concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court found the fast-food chain
the fiduciary of a franchisee to whom the chain had misleadingly understated the hassles
in getting donut ingredients.172 But Mister Donut did not so hold; instead, the Arizona
high court merely called the franchisor-franchisee relation “special,” citing Harold
Brown.173 Two years later a federal district court, applying Arizona law, corrected
Killion’s misreading.174 To Brown’s credit, not only do those courts that reject his
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position first explicitly consider following his advice,175 but academic lawyers stand by
his position even after courts have abandoned.176
Indeed, to call the franchise relation “fiduciary” overshoots the intentionally
incomplete contractual terms the parties have sketched out, whereby ownership resides in
the franchisee (who operates much like an independent contractor) and control resides in
the franchisor (who operates much like an employer). Thus throwing around the word
“fiduciary” as a way of characterizing franchisors’ obligations to franchisees completely
gives up on assessing the complexity of the relation, its long-term nature, the give and
take, and mostly, the reality that in the commercial world, we are all subject to others,
none of us wholly subservient nor powerful, a reality that “fiduciary” as label obscures.177
2. Insurers
If attempts to insinuate tendentious academic positions into fiduciary law were
unusual, I would not be pointing to them here. But they’re not. In 1974, two Boalt Hall
students, William Goodman and Thomas Seaton, published in their home law review a
foreword reviewing four cases then pending in the state high court where they had
interned.178 One of the four, Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., reinstated a jury’s
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compensatory damages in favor of a plaintiff whose insurer refused to pay losses from a
foot injury incurred when he fell into a working washing machine.179 According to
California’s high court, because the insurer’s unjustifiable attempt to avoid the policy
breached “its duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every policy,” the $75,000
compensatory award would stand.180 But the trial court had vacated the jury’s $500,000
punitive-damages award due to insufficient proof of scienter, an element of just
punishment.181 Goodman and Seaton lobbied the high court to reinstate the punitive
damages award:
It was in failing to meet its fiduciary obligations that the insurer in Silberg
exposed itself to compensatory and even punitive damages. The company was
aware of Silberg’s predicament; its behavior during his financial, physical, and
mental collapse can only be described as grossly insensitive, displaying a lack of
humanity that should have insulted not only the plaintiff and jurors but
California Life’s competitors as well. Its actions were the direct result of its
misconception of its proper loyalties. The Silberg opinion, hopefully, will leave
insurers with no doubt that with great power goes great responsibility.182
Just what the word “fiduciary” was meant here to add to an insurer’s good-faith
obligations the authors did not elaborate. When the trial court’s ruling vacating the
punitive-damages award was affirmed, nowhere in Justice Mosk’s twelve-page opinion
for the court did the word “fiduciary” appear.
The efforts of Goodman and Seaton to expand fiduciarian values were not in vain,
however. Five years later, in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company,183 the
California Supreme Court again affirmed a compensatory award while reversing a
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punitive award. This time, plaintiff’s suit against his insurer was for failure to investigate
his claim over four back injuries suffered over seven years.184 Justice Mosk, again writing
for the court, favorably quoted the recently published foreword of Goodman and Seaton:
[A]s a supplier of a public service rather than a manufactured product, the
obligations of insurers go beyond meeting reasonable expectations of coverage.
The obligations of good faith and fair dealing encompass qualities of decency
and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary. Insurers hold
themselves out as fiduciaries, and with the public's trust must go private
responsibility consonant with that trust.185
From this dictum on a principle of insurance contracts began a series of judicial faux pas.
Specifically, while admitting that Egan did not exactly rule on the matter, yet finding
“little room for doubt” that insurers are fiduciaries of their insureds, one court of appeal
was content “assuming” as much.186 Soon after, another, while finding “no support in
case law, other than dicta in a few Supreme Court cases,” found insurers “akin to” but not
quite fiduciaries, leaving room for insurers’ pursuit of self-interest.187
Six weeks later, Judge Keep, sitting in diversity, summarized California law on
the “difficult question” of whether insurers are fiduciaries.188 Delineating the difference
between the thing itself (a fiduciary relation) and the “seeming trend” toward something
similar (“fiduciary-like responsibilities”),189 she concluded that an “insurer is not required
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to put the insured’s interest before its own.”190 In dismissing plaintiff’s fiduciary claim
against defendant-insurer, Keep summed up that Egan, in stating that “the obligations of
good faith and fair dealing encompass qualities of decency and humanity inherent in the
responsibilities of a fiduciary,” was not saying that an insurer is a fiduciary; rather, Egan
said only that an insurer “must exhibit those characteristics of humanity and decency
which are similar to what is required of a fiduciary.”191 To Judge Keep, if the Egan court
or its successors “had meant to say that an insurer is a fiduciary, they would have said
so.”192 A relation may therefore be special or akin to fiduciary without at once being
fiduciary.193
Undeterred, commentators excusably thereafter continued to cite Egan for the
idea that insurers are fiduciaries of their insureds.194 Litigants not only did the same,195
but what is worse, continued on196 even after the California Supreme Court explicitly
sided with Judge Keep.197 This, decades after the notion of insurer as fiduciary was just a
gleam in the eyes of a pair of Berkeley law students.
3. Professors
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In 1976, the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted a “trend ... toward
liberalizing” the scope of fiduciary duties.198 As support for this trend, the court cited a
1937 case from the Maine Supreme Court199 in which the word “fiduciary” is absent, plus
an entry from a 1925 legal encyclopedia.200 In suits brought by disgruntled students
against their professors for breach of of fiduciary duty, liberalizing the tort had to await
the New Hampshire high court’s 1999 decision, Tracy Schneider v. Plymouth State
College.201 Trends must start somewhere; New Hampshire’s expansion of professorial
obligations started in the academic literature.
Schneider ruled that “in the context of sexual harassment by faculty members, the
relation of a post-secondary institution and its students is a fiduciary one.”202 The court’s
proffered authority for the proposition? – Ronna Greff Schneider’s 1987 “Sexual
Harassment and Higher Education,” published in the Texas Law Review.203 There, after
positing that “[t]he faculty-student relationship is best characterized as one of fiduciary
and beneficiary,” Professor Schneider cited professor of education and literature Billie
Dziech, and university administrator Linda Weiner, both at University of Cincinnati
where Schneider teaches law.204 While Dziech and Weiner’s The Lecherous Professor
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alludes to a “student’s natural trust of teachers,”205 the co-authors nowhere attribute legal
significance to that trust. Others have, however. Relying on Professor Schneider’s quoted
utterance above, Professor Carrie Baker’s “Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro
Quo Sexual Harassment” argued two decades ago that states should criminalize sexual
harassment just like the one state that has,206 Delaware.207
The origins of an academic push to liberalize the law go back further.
“Historically,” noted BYU law professors Brett Scharffs and John Welch in 2005, “the
association of teachers and their students has been viewed as a fiduciary relationship.”208
The authority for the proposition? – a 1957 article by Harvard law professor Warren
Seavey published in his home journal, where he stated: “Since schools exist primarily for
the education of their students, it is obvious that professors and administrators act in a
fiduciary capacity with reference to the students.”209 Because Professor Seavey declared
his assertion obvious, no supporting authority was forthcoming. After Seavey lobbed that
grenade over the wall, academic attempts to project fiduciary principles on to studentfaculty relations have continued,210 whether viewed as “sporadic”211 or “new,”212 often
relying on Seavey and other academics.213
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While litigated outcomes within this niche have largely resisted the expansion of
fiduciary duties,214 professors as students’ fiduciaries does make some sense when the
dispute is over something resembling a trust res, such as ownership of intellectual
property produced within a senior-junior, Platonic relation in a university lab.215 Those
cases reveal that doctrinally it is the combination of the personal (that is, whole-person)
and commercial (that is, discrete) that characterizes fiduciary law.216 Fiduciaries thus
stand in a sort of “Platonic plus” relation to servient parties: the Platonic part referring to
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power and information asymmetries, the plus part referring to the trust res and arm’slength commercial exchange. To be sure, the co-production of valuable ideas might well
occur within a nurturing Platonic relation conducted solely for the servient party’s
betterment; yet so too might it occur within a mutually exploitive relation, where the
servient party trades immediate property interests for career advances made possible only
by sitting at the elbow of a great teacher.
While student-professor skirmishes over intellectual-property rights reflect a
tension between fiduciarian and contractarian values,217 students also have attempted to
stretch fiduciary law when denied passing grades,218 athletic eligibility,219 special
accommodations,220 degrees,221 or professional opportunities.222 Those attempts to
expand fiduciary law by suing faculty, administrators, or the schools themselves223 may
be desperate responses to the inefficacy of suits for breach of contract224 and “educational
malpractice.”225 Yet rather than somehow cast tuition dollars as a sort of trust res, those
cases appeal to level playing fields as an offset against strong-party opportunism.
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And from there is it not far to where fiduciary “relations are social, domestic, or
merely personal,” entailing no property or “financial duty” whatsoever.226 Professor D.
Gordon Smith, pointing out the “pitfalls” that reliance on property poses for fiduciary
law, proposes to sub in for a trust res any “critical resource” subject to the servient
party’s control.227 Smith is particularly keen on including as critical resources a client’s
noncommercial confidences, a conventional item of non-property.228 For Smith, “critical
resources,” unlike any realistic notion of property, include one’s body as entitled to a
fiduciary’s protection.229
And it takes such a repudiation of a trust res element to explain Schneider, where
the plaintiff’s body was subject to her fiduciary-professor’s unwelcomed touchings.230
With Schneider on the books, other commentators felt free to declare it hornbook.231 A
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decade later, a federal district court, applying New Hampshire law, noted that Schneider
made fiduciaries of professors only in cases of sexual harassment,232 which happens to be
an actionable tort without the need for any fiduciary-law tinkerings.233
V. Expanding the Law: High Art or Axe-Grinding?
With social, domestic, or purely personal relations implicating “critical
resources,” parents, too, are held out as fiduciaries, not just when parents divert their
child’s earnings to themselves,234 but in cases of child abuse as well.235 The same is said
of married couples, not just in the disposition of marital property, but also where one
aggresses against the other’s “critical resources.” In this vein is it unsurprising that
clergy-abuse cases are characterized as breaches of fiduciary duties to protect the
physical integrity, not just property, of servient parties.236
This path of the law strikes me as eccentric. Suppose, for example, an attorney
(the “quintessential fiduciary”) impulsively settles a quarrel with a client by punching
him in the face. Should the client bring an action for breach of fiduciary duty? Can
“fiduciary” really be so cut off from its grammar, so beyond “Beyond Metaphor”237 and
into an idiomatic usage that trades on the criteria of fiduciary (selflessness, antiopportunism, protection of the weak) while at once denying those criteria (a trust res to
conserve or grow)?
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“Fiduciary” in this idiomatic sense is a movement in academic literature, where
the term now is deployed as a way of getting across an ideal – that opportunism is bad,
that other-regarding behavior is good.238 Indeed, some scholars seem to mean nothing at
all by it, one even using “fiduciary” in the title and then again for the first time in the
conclusion of a fifty-three page tract.239
These fiduciary-isms, these bendings over backwards to expand the law, have
succeeded to a point in that some have prevailed in court rulings rendered by judges who
are open to academic commentary. This is no mean feat, given that scholarship about
scholarship, of which there is much,240 agrees that judges cite professors infrequently.241
Even when they do, the cites count for little,242 only really mattering about 18% of the
time.243 With the exception of “a few transformative scholarly works” (e.g., Kathleen
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Sullivan’s “Unconstitutional Conditions,”244 Brandeis and Warren’s “The Right to
Privacy,”245 Charles Reich’s “The New Property”246), professors, to their
disappointment,247 write mainly for each other.248 Heavy hitters like Catherine
MacKinnon, Laurence Tribe, and Anthony Amsterdam (among others)249 are
consequently seen as outliers: unrepresentative of the group.250
The reasons for the irrelevance of scholarly efforts are familiar.251 Prominent
among content-related reasons is the contempt with which high-falutin’ academic lawyers
hold doctrine, including precedent, which they get paid to transcend.252 It’s hard to put a
positive spin on the fact that only seven percent of judges regularly read law reviews.253
But spin we do. Law professors “influence how judges decide cases,”254 even when uncited,255 if only by informing “the processes, individuals, and institutions that create the
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public policies that judges and lawyers eventually encounter in the cases that come before
them.”256 From this perspective, professors’ “subtle influences”257 have an ethereal
quality by which scholarship “provides a contextual social background for legal disputes,
helps to make judges aware of the underlying reasons for the decisions that they make
and offers useful suggestions for reform.”258 Because “a law review's treatment of an
issue ... often provides the jump spark that allows the judge to get underway in the
intellectual effort of shaping the opinion,”259 it has been said that “no principled approach
to decision-making can ignore the contribution of academics.”260
Be that as it may, most judges can’t be bothered.261 In a recent reboot of his
controversial 1992 critique of law reviews,262 Judge Harry Edwards cites Supreme Court
justices as among those on the bench who locate journal writing somewhere from “not
particularly helpful” (Roberts) to out of touch (Scalia) to “outer space” (Breyer).263
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The Ninth Circuit’s Alex Kozinski is an exception.264 Some of the academic
influence he detects is dilute, as in the lasting impression casebooks make on anyone with
a J.D.265 Other influence is stronger, as where the writings of stubborn academics, like
dissenting opinions, keep “the flame alive” of disfavored positions,266 or introduce “an
entirely new legal idea or line of argument.”267
To illustrate, Kozinski recounts the “remarkable” doings of Professor Paul
Cassell, whose mid-90’s writings were at war with 60’s icon Miranda v. Arizona.268 In
1997, Cassell filed an amicus brief in the Fourth Circuit reviving a stillborn federal
statute, the unconstitutionality of which had been justifiably taken for granted since its
1968 enactment.269 Exploiting what he saw as a loophole in Miranda’s celebrated
“prophylactic rule” regulating police interrogation, Cassell induced the Fourth Circuit to
deem defendant Charles Dickerson’s un-Mirandized confession admissible.270 Although
Cassell’s run in the high court ended just after Kozinski’s article was published,271
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Kozinski, anticipating that possibility, nonetheless fancied Cassell’s efforts a
“monumental academic achievement.”272
But why? Wasn’t Cassell doing exactly what Judge Merritt thought my antitrust
professor was doing – just putting stuff out there (at best), stooping to axe-grinding (at
worst)? There was a reason, after all, that no federal prosecutor had ever invoked the
statute to admit a confession. Yet to Judge Kozinski, Cassell’s activity instantiates high
professorial art. I wonder what he would say about a recent article positing the
unconstitutionality of the NSA’s meta-data program because the program relies on Katz
v. United States,273 a 1967 ruling which, by coming to rely on a concurring opinion, is,
get this: no authority at all.274 So can all attempts to dispose of 50 years of precedent
count as high art like Brown v. Board of Education,275 which overthrew a case finally
seen as “wrong the day it was decided”?276 How about an article contorting concepts of
mens rea and causation in order to call suicidal reactions to cyberbullying “homicide”?277
Or a student comment petitioning to criminalize whistling at women in public?278 As
entertaining as these exercises may be, are they, like Cassell’s once were, the beginnings
of “monumental academic achievement?” Possibly. Or they could be the sort of
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indulgences that led Justice Scalia at an oral argument to accuse counsel of “bucking for
a ... place on some law school faculty” by looking to overrule the Slaughter-House
Cases,279 “contrary to 140 years of our jurisprudence.”280
Recall the strides made by Professor Schneider imposing fiduciary law on
professors, Harold Brown on franchisors, and student-authors William Goodman and
Thomas Seaton on insurers. Thanks to them and other like-minded scholars, fiduciary law
really is anything goes – in court too – its grammar now not only cut off from the law of
trusts (or trust-like relations), but quite recently having devolved into an altogether nontechnical term of art. This explains the scholarly output on fiduciary voting,281 judging,282
governance,283 politics,284 juries,285 and friendship,286 not to mention fiduciary
administrative,287 criminal,288 equal protection,289 and health290 law. I could go on.291
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VI. Conclusion
It would be misleading to say that professors write only for each other within the
world of fiduciary law. There they have made and continue to make their mark, for better
or worse. And what should they be doing if not “the business of creating a new stock of
legal ideas”?292 Professors must “have better things to do with their time than to provide
free research for judges,”293 whose law clerks should be the ones knocking out the
wooden 50-state surveys and other documents of practicality.
Yet so too is there a responsibility, a need to acknowledge that Hamlet is not a
comedy, even if you can convince someone that it is. Certainly our language provides
conventions for speaking strangely or in extraordinary ways: speaking, for instance,
metaphorically, cryptically, loosely, personally.294 Language changes; meanings “will of
course, stretch and shrink, and they will be stretched and shrunk.”295 That language
inevitably changes is no reason to change it just for the sake of change. Language is
natural, and so its changing is natural,296 not homemade or arbitrary.297 Legal language
can accordingly get pushed and pulled,298 and like all exertions, at times too far or in the
wrong direction to where, as J.L. Austin cautioned in the opening epigraph above, “there
would clearly be no future in it.”
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Knowing when, exactly, that sort of excess is staked is a knack.
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